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of the fair market value of property inherently factors in inflation, and
any additional adjustments would be unreasonable. Thus, the court
affirmed the dismissal of the Walceks' complaint.
Mark Shea
SECOND CIRCUIT
Altman v. Town of Amherst, No. 01-7468, 2002 WL 31132139 (2nd Cir.
Sept. 26, 2002) (holding that a determination of whether a point
source discharge of properly used pesticides into waters of the United
States requires an NPDES or SPEDS permit will remain undecided
until the EPA interprets whether the Clean Water Act includes this
type of discharge).
Michael and Susan Altman ("Altmans"), residents of Amherst, New
York, commenced a suit against the Town of Amherst ("Amherst") in
the United States District Court for the Western District of New York
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, civil penalties, and attorney's
fees for violations of permit requirements of the Clean Water Act
("CWA"). The Altmans alleged that Amherst violated the CWA by
spraying pesticides for mosquito control in federal wetlands without a
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit or
a State Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("SPDES") permit.
Amherst argued they only needed a permit from the New York State
Department of Environmental Conservation ("DEC") to spray
pesticides for mosquito control when the city discharged the pesticides
directly into United States' waters. After a failed settlement attempt,
Amherst filed a motion to dismiss. The district court granted
Amherst's motion. It held that no issues of material fact existed and
that pesticides, when used for their intended purpose, do not
constitute a pollutant as defined by the CWA. Further, the court
decided that the Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
("FIFRA") more aptly applied to this particular situation. Finally, it
granted Amherst's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that
Amherst only needed a DEC freshwater permit to spray pesticides.
The Altmans appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit raising three issues: (1) FIFRA did not foreclose,
preempt, or supercede the permit requirements under section 402 of
the CWA; (2) state and federal acquiescence to Amherst's discharges
without a CWA permit was unlawful; and (3) good-faith use of
pesticides even for their intended purpose did not make the spray
something other than a pollutant according to the meaning of the
CWA. The appellate court vacated the decision and remanded the
case to the district court.
The CWA permit requirements apply when a party discharges a
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pollutant from a point source into waters of the United States. The
appellate court focused on the fact that the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") had not articulated a clear interpretation of current
law dealing with whether pesticides used properly and released over or
into waters of the United States triggered the requirement of an
NPDES or SPDES permit. It determined that the question would
remain open until the EPA decided the issue.
The district court acted with an incomplete record and failed to
consider threshold questions of law. The court suggested that the
Altmans amend their complaint to join federal and state agencies
necessary to resolve this issue. The appellate court also issued five
guidelines for the district court. First, the district court needed to
consider whether freshwater wetlands in New York are "waters of the
United States." Second, the district court should examine whether the
use of the particular pesticides in this case constituted the "deliberate
discharge" of pollutants into the waters of the United States. Third,
the district court must determine if Amherst properly used the
pesticides for their intended purpose. Fourth, the district court
needed to determine whether any of the pesticides applied,
discharged, or sprayed by Amherst were pollutants as defined by the
CWA. Fifth, the district court must use persuasive authority of recent
case law from the United States Supreme Court and the Second
Circuit.
Adriano Martinez

FOURTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Interstate Gen. Co., 39 Fed. Appx. 870 (4th Cir. 2002)
(holding that a Supreme Court decision subsequent to a plea
agreement and consent decree entered into by appellants and the
United States did not eliminate the federal government's jurisdiction
and did not legalize the conduct underlying appellant's criminal
conviction because the decision dealt with a provision of 33 C.F.R. §
328.3(a) (3) that the government had not used to assertjurisdiction for
the plea agreement or the consent decree).
This appeal arose out of a denial by the Maryland United States
District Court of Interstate General Company's ("IGC") petition for
writ of error coram nobis and motion to vacate. As grounds for its writ
and motion to vacate, IGC argued the Supreme Court's subsequent
decision in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers ("SWANCC') legalized the conduct underlying
IGC's criminal conviction. Thus, appellants claimed they did not
violate the Clean Water Act ("CWA") by filling in certain wetlands
because SWANCC eliminated the federal government's jurisdiction

